

## Philosophisches Kolloquium WS 20/21

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**Title: "Can Merely Statistical Evidence Provide Knowledge?"**

*Abstract:* Lottery cases, cases of naked statistical evidence, and fine-tuning arguments can provide a thinker with evidence that ensures a high probability in some claim  $p$ . Yet it's widely believed that  $p$ 's being very probable on one's evidence is insufficient for justified belief that  $p$  and therefore also insufficient for knowing that  $p$ . Accordingly, lottery cases and cases of naked statistical evidence are cases where justification and knowledge are inaccessible. This lesson seems to naturally extend to fine-tuning arguments (for theism or a multiverse).

In this paper I provide cases where one's evidence is statistical in a way that parallels lottery cases, cases of naked statistical evidence, and fine-tuning arguments. But, shockingly, our intuitions are reversed: these parallel cases *are* cases where high probability justifies belief and holds the promise of knowledge. Existing accounts of what goes wrong in cases of "merely statistical evidence" cannot explain the justificatory asymmetry between the parallel cases of statistical evidence. I construct two new options. One builds on insights from Williamson. Another builds on insights from Lewis.