Workshop “Empirical Methods of Linguistics in Philosophy”

Technische Universität Dortmund, 13–14 March 2014

Theme

The “experimental philosophy” movement has recently gained some momentum in the philosophical community. The movement’s basic idea is to introduce experimental methods (other than thought experiments) or, more broadly, empirical methods to philosophy. Appropriated from the experimental paradigm in psychology, the method first and most often employed in experimental philosophy arguably is the use of questionnaires. Using experimental studies of this kind in philosophy may serve a number of purposes. A prominent one is to supplement the more traditional tools of analytic philosophy which are used in conceptual analyses of philosophically interesting terms. However, there is also a variety of other (at least partially) empirical methods in linguistics, e.g. methods from psycholinguistics, corpus analysis, etymology, discourse analysis or field studies, which could also be used for this purpose or a variety of other purposes in philosophy.

The first set of guiding questions of the workshop is: Which empirical methods from linguistics have been applied in philosophy already? To which end? Where and how could such methods be applied? The literature at present is sparse and scattered across various journals, the common methodological root is not always apparent. It is therefore expedient to gain an overview on the approaches that have already been tried, and to consider potential applications of methods that have not yet been tried. This, of course, also raises methodological questions. Most importantly: What are the potential benefits of the different empirical methods from linguistics for philosophy, and what are the limits of their application?

Aim

The workshop brings together researchers who implement empirical methods from linguistics in their philosophical research. Although the focus of the workshop is on the use of such methods in philosophy, both philosophers and linguists will be involved. Each of the six workshop sessions will open with a philosophical paper demonstrating the application of a specific linguistic method in philosophy. The paper will be followed by two peer commentaries, one by a linguist, the other by a philosopher.

The primary purpose of the workshop is exploratory: The potential applications, the benefits and the limits of linguistic methods in philosophy stand in need of clarification. The secondary purpose is to create a networking opportunity for researchers who employ (and those who intend to employ) empirical methods from linguistics in philosophy. The workshop is intended to pilot a larger conference, to be held in 2015.
Programme
(Last updated: 6 March 2014)

Thursday, 13 March 2014

13.30–14.00 Registration
14.00–14.15 Workshop opening
Roland Bluhm (Dortmund)
14.15–15.15 Session 1: Corpus Analysis
Aurelie Herbelot (Cambridge): “Distributional Semantics for Philosophy”
30 min expository paper;
10–20 min peer commentaries:
Bill Louw (University of Zimbabwe)
Marija Milojkovic (Belgrade)
10–20 min Discussion
Chair: Roland Bluhm (Dortmund)
15.15–15.45 Coffee break
15.45–16.45 Session 2: Questionnaires Studies and Comparative Linguistics
Shin Sakuragi (Shibaura Institute of Technology, Tōkyō): “Memory Expressions and Linguistic Methods”
30 min expository paper;
10–20 min peer commentary:
James Andow (Nottingham)
Ave Mets (Tartu)
10–20 min Discussion
Chair: Nathan Wildman (Hamburg)
16.45–17.45 Session 3: Questionnaire Studies
Magdalena Sztencel (Newcastle): “Reconciling Truth-Based Inference with Subjective Inference? A View from a Multiple-Trace Theory of Memory”
30 min expository paper;
10 min peer commentary:
Ave Mets (Tartu)
20 min Discussion
Chair: Dejan Makovec (Vienna)
19.30– Conference dinner
Friday, 14 March 2014

08.30–09.30 Session 4: Psycholinguistics

Anna Drożdżowicz (Oslo): “Speakers’ Judgments about Utterance Content and How to Get Them – the Verification Task and the Truth-Value Judgment Task”

30 min expository paper;
10–20 min peer commentaries:
Alexander auf der Straße (Düsseldorf)
Anton Betz (Centre for General Linguistics, Berlin)

10–20 min Discussion
Chair: Kevin Reuter (Bochum)

09.30–10.30 Session 5: Psycholinguistics

Eugen Fischer (East Anglia): “Psycholinguistics for Philosophy: Explaining and Assessing Paradoxical Intuitions”

30 min expository paper;
10–20 min peer commentaries:
Kevin Reuter (Bochum)
Dejan Makovec (Vienna)

10–20 min Discussion
Chair: N.N.

10.30–11.00 Coffee break

11.00–12.00 Session 6: Typology and Diachronic Linguistics

Barbara Vetter & Emanuel Viebahn (HU Berlin): “Are Modals Polysemous?”

30 min expository paper;
10 min peer commentary:
Nathan Wildman (Hamburg)

20 min Discussion
Chair: Alexander auf der Straße (Düsseldorf)

12.00–13.00 Lunch break

13.00–14.00 General discussion / future plans

14.00 Workshop Closing

The workshop is graciously supported by

GdF, the Gesellschaft der Freunde der Technischen Universität Dortmund e. V. (the Society of the friends of TU Dortmund University) and

GAP, Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e. V. (the Society for Analytical Philosophy).
Aurelie Herbelot (Cambridge): "Distributional Semantics for Philosophy"

Distributional semantics is a linguistic approach to the representation of meaning which has its origins in the 1950s, notably in the works of Harris (1954) and Firth (1957) (for an overview, see Turney and Pantel, 2010; Erk, 2012; Clark, 2012). In this framework, meaning is viewed in a (roughly) language-internal way, where words are defined in terms of each other. The representation of *cat*, for example, is the set of linguistic contexts associated with *cat* – its so-called ‘distribution’ – as obtained from very large corpora. The notion of context varies according to implementations, ranging from lexical items in a word window (e.g. any item appearing within five words of *cat* becomes a context for its distribution) to dependencies (e.g. `[NsubjV] chase` is a possible context for *cat*, indicating that in some sentence(s), *cat* is subject of *chase*). Contexts are normally weighted according to some function indicating their strength of association with the word for which the distribution is built, so the distribution of *cat* may have a weight of 0.7 for the context *meow*, a lower weight of 0.5 for the context *animal* (because other things are animals too) and a weight of 0.0001 for the context *biography*.

Distributions have a mathematical representation as vectors in a semantic space where each dimension corresponds to a possible context. Because of this, the theory affords a natural interpretation of similarity: calculating how ‘close’ the vectors of words $w_1$ and $w_2$ are in the semantic space gives a quantitative notion of how similar $w_1$ and $w_2$ are. It will be found, typically, that the vectors for *cat* and *dog* are closer than those for, say, *cat* and *democracy*.

Distributions cannot be taken as general conceptual representations, the main issue being their focus on linguistic information (ignoring a lot of pragmatics). However, they are suited to the formalisation of abstract concepts which, as argued by Paivio (1986), are linguistically encoded in the human cognitive system. And they are of course a good representation of ordinary language use as such.

In this talk, I will briefly present three applications of distributional semantics to philosophy:

1. The analysis of ‘discourse’ in critical theory. Being typically obtained on large amounts of actual utterances from thousands of different speakers, distributions are appropriate to represent the norming aspects of language use, i.e. the contribution of language to social constructivism.

2. The analysis of concept change in the history of ideas. The distribution of a particular concept can be built from the works of different authors and/or from different periods. Comparing the obtained representations using similarity and derived methods can help a) identifying concepts which may not be expressed by the same lexical item in different authors b) identifying changes in the meaning of a particular word c) pinpointing which aspect of a concept is changing over time.

3. The simulation of metaphysical theories in philosophy of language. I will focus here on a particular example: the simulation of different approaches to modality using a combination of set-theoretic and distributional semantics. I will show that the formalisation and implementation of a philosophical proposal using computational methods can provide vital data for the evaluation of that proposal by philosophers.
Shin Sakuragi (Shibaura Institute of Technology, Tōkyō):
"Memory Expressions and Linguistic Methods"

What is memory? Philosophers have been asking this question ever since antiquity. However, the question is attracting more psychologists and neuroscientists than philosophers today, and the way in which scientists approach the question is radically different from philosophers’. Analytic philosophers, for instance, have studied different meanings of ‘remember’ and asked whether memory has any causal implication (see, for instance, Bernecker 2010). Meanwhile, scientists study our behavior and our brain. Those who focus on scientific study of memory rarely stopped to think about the concept of memory (see, for instance, Tulving 2000, 33). Even while preparing a questionnaire survey, they do not pay much attention to what is really meant by ‘memory’ or ‘remember’ in their questions and the informants’ answers.

Perhaps, scientists find no interest in the conceptual study of memory, simply because they assume what is meant by those memory terms is self-evident. Unfortunately, it’s not. Although ‘remembering,’ or any other memory concepts, has never been a major topic in philosophy, some of the philosophical inquiries in the mid-twentieth century have been devoted to such a conceptual study, especially in relation to the conceptual connection between one’s personhood and his memory. They have revealed very subtle implications hidden behind different grammatical forms or contexts in which ‘remember’ and other memory verbs are used.

My primary research interest is in line with this philosophical tradition; I’m interested in the concept of memory. However, in an important way, my approach in this presentation is radically different. As is always the case in analytic philosophy, philosophers have focused on the concepts expressed by English words, like ‘remember.’ On the other hand, contrastive studies in linguistics have found ample evidence for the diversity of concepts expressed by memory terms in different languages (see Amberer 2007). Those studies have shown that folk concepts of memory are much more diverse and complex than most analytic philosophers may assume.

In this presentation, I will focus on ‘remember’ and its corresponding expressions in Japanese, and try to compare them chiefly by means of linguistic methods. Linguistic methods, such as questionnaire surveys and corpora, may show us subtle differences in how those memory expressions are used in day-to-day contexts. Some of such differences are of philosophical importance. The famous Lockean argument for the conceptual connection between one’s personhood and his ‘remembering’ may not be said to stand in Japanese as is in English. For, an intuitive difference between ‘remember that’ and ‘remember doing’ is absent in the corresponding Japanese expressions. In this presentation, by exploring difference between two

References


languages further, I will try to find an insight into how to approach the question of what memory is after all.

References

Magdalena Sztencel (Newcastle):
"Reconciling Truth-Based Inference with Subjective Inference? A View from a Multiple-Trace Theory of Memory"

1. This study is placed within a growing framework of research which does not presuppose the traditional dual-processing (first context-independent decoding and then context-dependent pragmatic inferring) model of utterance interpretation (e.g. Hintzman 1986, Gibbs 2002, Barsalou 2005, Author submitted, see also Bilgrami 1992 and Recanati 2005).

From a psychological perspective, this study implements a multiple-trace theory of memory and information retrieval (Hintzman 1986), whereby (cognitive) context has immediate/direct influence on the process of utterance interpretation (i.e. there is no context-independent decoding of specifically linguistic semantic content). This theory proposes that categorisation does not require the existence of a category’s summary representation (a.k.a. prototype, schema, abstract concept or – more generally – linguistic/lexical semantics). Rather, abstract concepts of a category can be retrieved on-line in response to context. I will refer to this approach as WHOLLY PRAGMATIC.

A wholly pragmatic approach is compatible with the existence of dynamic frequency biased interpretations – a.k.a. ‘attractors’ – as long as it is acknowledged that contextual factors may inhibit such attractors and facilitate other interpretive strategies (e.g. Barsalou 2005).

A wholly pragmatic approach is empirically-grounded. First, the multiple-trace theory of memory is supported by a simulation model of episodic memory - MINERVA 2, which has been successfully applied to the task of abstract concept retrieval (Hintzman 1986). Second, reaction time experiments reported in Gibbs (e.g. 2002) establish that, if the context is right, people comprehend (even novel) non-literal expressions as fast as or faster than their literal counterparts. This result seems incompatible with dual-processing models which would predict the comprehension time of (especially novel) non-literal expressions to be longer.

2. My study focuses on the word *if*. This has to do with the fact that the debate between theorists who argue for the Material Implication (MI) analysis of the semantics of *if* (the pro-MI camp) and those who argue against it (the anti-MI camp) has – thus far – been difficult to resolve.

The pro-MI camp can explain why not all conditionals diverge from MI and, if they do, how it happens (e.g. Grice 1989). In the anti-MI camp, attention has been drawn to the existence of conditional belief deviations from MI (Edgington 1995, 2008). These cannot be explained away in pragmatic terms.

The pro-MI vs. anti-MI debate is significant as at stake is the question of whether the word *if* is used to express truth-evaluable propositions and both sides seem to have strong and convincing,
yet mutually-exclusive arguments. From the perspective of a wholly pragmatic approach, the
unnecessary) disagreement is due to the problematic assumptions that (i) there is such a thing as
coded/linguistic semantics, which (ii) should be the locus of objectivity.

Using questionnaire data from social psychology (Beller 2002), I discuss an important semantics-
pragmatics asymmetry in the false processing of conditionals (as well as the limitation of
questionnaire data for my study). The discussed asymmetry illustrates the inevitability of
pragmatic intrusion into the purportedly encoded semantics of if: the application of MI in
conditional thoughts and utterances (or lack of it) always depends on a cogniser’s (cognitive)
context – i.e. it is pragmatically determined.

3. In this situation, one can either assume that if is not used to express truth-evaluable
propositions (c.f. Edgington) or reconcile truth-based inference with context-dependent and thus
subjective inference (proposed here). The latter is not a new idea – philosophers and linguists
have argued for context-dependent truth value assignment (e.g. Stalnaker 1975, van der Auwera
1986, Carston 2002). What is new about a wholly pragmatic approach is: (i) its radical scope of
application (if, or, and, not); relatedly, (ii) re-directing attention from the search of objectivity in
linguistic expressions (i.e. purportedly en-/decoded linguistic semantics) to the search of
objectivity in LOT formulae; and (iii) compatibility of work in philosophy and linguistics with
empirically grounded work in psychology.

References
Barsalou, L. (2005): “Abstraction as Dynamic Interpretation in Perceptual Symbol Systems”. In: Gershkoff-Stowe, L.
Erlbaum, 113–118.
Pragmatics 34, 457–486.
Approach to Utterance Interpretation”.

Anna Drożdżowicz (Oslo):
“Speakers’ Judgments about Utterance Content and How to Get Them – the Verification
Task and the Truth-Value Judgment Task”

The Gricean distinction between sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning (Grice, 1965) is
potentially relevant to many debates in philosophy of language (those recently active include
contextualism/relativism in semantics; faultless disagreement; the limits of truth-conditional
semantics; vagueness; figurative speech). Most would agree that the communicated content of
the utterance goes well beyond sentence meaning, and more recently many have argued that the
sentence meaning does not determine the proposition expressed in its use (Recanati, 2004;
Carston, 2002; Sperber & Wilson, 1986, 2010). Thus contextual analysis of the way the sentence is
intended by speakers and interpreted by hearers is relevant.

One way to do that is to take as evidence speakers’ judgments about the communicated content.
The strategy is not an innocent one (Bach, 2002) and much would depend on applying a proper
method. In my talk I will distinguish between what I call the epistemic question – that is whether
speakers’ judgments about content/sentence truth-conditions provide evidence about sentence
meaning and the methodological question, that is, a question of how we could induce, gather and
evaluate such judgments so they could serve as a relevant data in the theory of meaning.

I will suspend the epistemic question and assume that speakers’ intuitions about what is said
really tell us something relevant here. What I will investigate is the methodological aspects of
collecting and understanding such data.

In order to address this question I will focus on two methods from psycholinguistics that I take to
be prima facie promising strategies for eliciting speakers’ judgments about the communicated
content.

The verification task is a method used mostly in studies on natural language quantifiers (Geurts,
2002; Geurts Pouscoulous, 2009). Within this paradigm participants are presented with a target
sentence and asked to choose an interpretation from the delivered visual material, which typically
reflects the two possible readings that a sentence might have. The emphasis is put on presenting
subjects with partly non-verbal stimuli (Geurts, 2002).

The truth-value judgment task is the other paradigm I will discuss. The task was primarily
introduced in the studies on language acquisition in children (Crain McKee, 1985) to test children’s
knowledge of a syntactic constraint, but has also been used to test all aspects of sentence
interpretation, and especially to examine whether certain sentences are ambiguous for children.

While the task is typically used with 3–6 years-olds, I propose that a similar design can be
introduced in adults where they are engaged in the scenario where the sentences are part of the
scenario itself – they are actually uttered. I will compare the two tasks and argue that they
substantially differ in several respects and thus the verification task should not be taken as a kind
of truth-value judgment task. I will also evaluate the two paradigms with respect to how well they
capture speakers’ judgments about content. I will adopt the notion of a pragmatic fact (Noveck &
Sperber, 2007) and argue that it provides useful methodological guideline. I will argue that the
truth-value judgment task and not the verification task allows us to capture such understood
pragmatic facts.

References

Syntax and Semantics. Cambridge
Eugen Fischer (East Anglia):
"Psycholinguistics for Philosophy: Explaining and Assessing Paradoxical Intuitions"

The ‘sources project’ emerging from experimental philosophy seeks to develop psychological explanations of philosophically relevant intuitions which help us assess their evidentiary value (Fiala et al. 2011, Fischer 2013, Nagel 2010, 2012, Nahmias and Murray 2010, Nichols and Knobe 2007). Most contributions to this research programme draw on findings from cognitive or social psychology. This paper explores how psycholinguistics can contribute to the project: It presents fresh research which deploys psycholinguistic findings to develop an assessment-facilitating explanation of intuitions that raise a philosophical paradox. The paper then examines how a familiar package of complementary methods from psycholinguistics can be employed to further develop and test this explanation, and reports results of a first norming study undertaken by the author and psycholinguist Paul Engelhardt. The methodological package includes questionnaire-based listing, sentence-completion, and plausibility-rating tasks (Ferretti et al. 2001, McRae et al. 1997), reading-time measurements with eye tracking (Patson and Warren 2010, Rayner and Schotter 2013), and electrophysiological ERP studies (Kutas and Federmeier 2000, 2011).

The paper develops an explanation of so-called ‘phenomenal intuitions’ that are key premises of the ‘argument from illusion’, a classical paradox about perception that has again become a focus of debate (Brewer 2011, Crane 2011, Fish 2009, Nudds 2009, Robinson 2001, Smith 2002). To explain those key intuitions, the paper draws on the experimentally well-supported graded salience hypothesis (Giora 2003, Peleg and Giora 2011) and work on automatic stereotype-use in verb comprehension (Ferretti et al. 2001, McRae et al. 1997, Metusalem et al. 2012). Developing observations by J.L Austin (1962), the paper argues that, in the initial premises of arguments from illusion, philosophers unwittingly use verbs in a new sense, but then automatically infer patient/object-properties stereotypically associated with the established sense of those verbs, in which they do not apply to the non-stereotypical situations at issue. These automatic inferences are unwittingly made by thinkers who explicitly reject them (e.g. Broad 1923, Price, 1932, Ayer 1940, 1956, and above) and lead, in conjunction with further automatic inferences, to the ‘phenomenal’ intuitions targeted (Fischer, in press-a, in press-b). By tracing these intuitions back to inferences thinkers automatically make but explicitly reject, we can expose them as cognitive illusions without evidentiary value (Pohl 2004).

After presenting this debunking explanation, the paper discusses how familiar psycholinguistic methods can be used to confirm or disconfirm it: In a first study, Fischer and Engelhardt have used questionnaire-based plausibility-rating tasks to test our hypotheses about which patient/object-properties are stereotypically associated with the relevant verbs: In impoverished contexts, sentences consistent with the stereotype are judged more plausible than sentences inconsistent with it. Reading-time measurements help determine whether automatic inferences to such stereotypical property-attributions actually occur in language use: Psycholinguists predict longer
reading-times where subsequent text is inconsistent with inferred attributions (Klin et al. 1999, Harmon-Vukic et al. 2009). Eye-tracking (Patson and Warren 2010, Rayner and Schotter 2013) allows for precise localisation of the perceived conflict. This narrows down the range of automatically inferred conclusions potentially responsible for the conflict. Since slowdowns can be due to a variety of factors (word frequency, etc.), such measurements should be complemented by ERP experiments, which elicit an electrophysiological signature response to perceived incongruence (Kutas and Federmeier 2000, 2011). ERPs provide further information about when the incongruence is detected and what kind of incongruence (syntactic/semantic) it is (Kutas & Hillyard 1980). By explaining how these well-established methods can be employed to develop and test the proposed explanation of ‘phenomenal’ intuitions, the paper explores how psycholinguistic methods can contribute to experimental philosophy’s ‘sources project’ and the resolution of philosophical paradoxes.

References
Barbara Vetter & Emanuel Viebahn (HU Berlin):
“Are Modals Polysemous?”

This paper shows how empirical linguistic methods can fruitfully be applied in the philosophical analysis of modal expressions, such as ‘can’ and ‘may’. In particular, we use empirical evidence from linguistics to call into question an assumption that is almost universally made in certain philosophical debates: the assumption that modals are univocal.

Modals such as ‘can’ and ‘may’ are clearly polyfunctional: they can be used to express different flavours of modality. For instance,

(1) Holmes may travel to Paris,

can be read epistemically (it is possible, for all we know, that ...) or deontically (Holmes is permitted to ...). In philosophy, it is almost unanimously agreed that this polyfunctionality is a case of context-sensitivity: modals such as ‘may’ are univocal, i.e., they have a single meaning (or sense) that can take on different flavours in different contexts. We argue, on the contrary, that these expressions are polysemous between different senses that each correspond to a single modal flavour. To do so, we counter the strongest argument for univocality (stated clearly by Hacquard 2011), which runs as follows: (i) there are many languages with polyfunctional modals; (ii) if those modals were not univocal, this widespread polyfunctionality would be an improbable and inexplicable lexical accident; so we should hold that these modals are univocal. We employ data from typology and diachronic linguistics to question both premises of this argument.

First, we use recent typological studies (e.g. van der Auwera and Ammann 2011) to question premise (i). The studies show that modal polyfunctionality is not as widespread across languages as is often assumed, and is in fact only typical for European languages. We also point out that many of those languages that contain polyfunctional modals contain separate expressions that disambiguate between modals flavours.

We then use findings in diachronic linguistics by Bybee et al. (1994) to question premise (ii) by showing that in many languages modal expressions overlap in at least some stages of their historical development. We argue that because of such shared histories it is to be expected (and quite explicable) that some modal expressions are polysemous between different types of modality.
Finally, and importantly, we show how the plausibility of modal polysemy impacts two current philosophical debates. In the debate about epistemic modals, the assumption of univocality has been used by Schaffer (2011) to argue against a relativist position. Relativists (e.g. Egan 2007) hold that the semantic content of (1) is invariant across contexts and that it is a non-classical proposition, whose truth-value can shift with the context. According to Schaffer, the “unity of the modals” counts against this view; our argument enables us to reject this alleged unity.

In the debate about metaphysical modality, the polysemy of modals makes more plausible a deeper distinction between possibility and conceivability, as against some recent arguments by David Chalmers (2010, 2012). It thereby supports views of metaphysical modality (e.g. Shoemaker 1998, Bird 2007) on which metaphysical necessity is an even more deeply empirical matter than Kripke (1972) has argued.

References


Practical Information

The workshop venue & how to get there

The workshop will be held at the Erich-Brost-Institut of TU Dortmund University:

Erich-Brost-Institut
Otto-Hahn-Straße 2
44227 Dortmund

How to get to Dortmund

Dortmund is, of course, linked to Germany’s railway, and there are frequent trains going in and coming from every direction.

The closest airports are Dortmund and Düsseldorf (ca. 1 hour by train). Köln-Bonn Airport (ca. 2 hours) and Hannover Airport (ca. 2.5 hours) may be alternatives.

How to get to TU Dortmund University

From Dortmund main station (Dortmund Hauptbahnhof, abbreviated Dortmund Hbf.) take the S-Bahn No. 1 (S1) heading towards Solingen Hbf. Get off at Dortmund-Universität, the third stop (6 min ride).

Find more help at http://www.tu-dortmund.de/uni/International/Contact_and_Directions/.
Train schedules can be found and online tickets bought at http://www.bahn.de.

How to get to the Erich-Brost-Institut

Assuming you got off at the railway station Dortmund-Universität, the Erich-Brost-Institut is in walking distance (5 min): Follow the bulk of the students heading past the main library (Bibliothek) on your left. Walk straight across the bridge and past the refectory (Mensa) to your right. You will come to a square. Take a left. Erich-Brost-Institut is to your left at the end of the footpath.

Find a map at http://www.tu-dortmund.de/uni/International/Contact_and_Directions/ (the venue is labelled No. 22) or at http://www.brost.org/anfahrt.html.

If you get lost

Ask any student. Most should be able to help in some way.

Accommodation in Dortmund

Hotels can be found at, e.g., http://www.hotel.de or www.hrs.de. We suggest you look for a hotel close to Dortmund Hbf.

Bed ‘n’ Breakfast can be found, e.g., at http://www.airbnb.com.
Venue for the Conference Dinner

sissikingkong
Landwehrstraße 17
44147 Dortmund

A map can be found at http://www.sissikingkong.de/?page_id=53.
The sissikingkong is close to Dortmund Hbf (10–15 min walk) or the U-Bahn (underground) station Dortmund-Hafen (U47 from Dortmund Hbf, 5–10 min walk).

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